



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20223

Freedom of Information Act Program
Communications Center
245 Murray Lane, S.W., Building T-5, Mail Stop 8205
Washington, D.C. 20223

Date: October 4, 2024

Judicial Watch
425 Third Street, SW, Suite 800
Washington, DC 20024
Email: bmarshall@judicialwatch.org; sdunagan@judicialwatch.org

File Number: 20220628-L, 1:22-cv-03147 ; 20220621-L, 1:22-cv-03275

Dear Requester:

This is the final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, originally received by the United States Secret Service (Secret Service) on August 2022, for information pertaining to file in litigation.

After a detailed review of all potentially responsive records, 8 pages were released and 0 pages were withheld in their entirety. After considering the "Foreseeable Harm" standard, outlined in Title 5 U.S.C § 552(a)(8)(A)(i) and Department of Justice guidance, exemptions under FOIA Statute Title 5 U.S.C. § 552, and/or the PA Statute Title 5 U.S.C. § 552a, have been applied where deemed appropriate.

Enclosed are the documents responsive to your request, as well as a document that explains the exemptions in more detail. Withheld information is pursuant to the exemptions marked below.

Section 552 (FOIA)

(b) (1)	(b) (2)	(b) (3) Statute:		
(b) (4)	(b) (5)	(b) (6)	(b) (7) (A)	(b) (7) (B)
(b) (7) (C)	(b) (7) (D)	(b) (7) (E)	(b) (7) (F)	(b) (8)

Please be advised, in the processing of this FOIA request, no fees are being assessed.

If you need any further assistance, or would like to discuss any aspect of your request, please contact our FOIA Public Liaison Kevin Tyrrell, at (202) 220-1819. Alternatively, you may send an email to foia@uss.s.dhs.gov.

FOIA File No. 20220628-L is assigned to your request. Please refer to this file number in all future communication with this office.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Kevin L. Tyrrell". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized 'K' and 'T'.

Kevin L. Tyrrell
Freedom of Information Act Officer
Office of Intergovernmental and Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:
FOIA and Privacy Act Exemption List

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552**

Provisions of the Freedom of Information Act do not apply to matters that are:

- (b) (1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept Secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy; and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order;
- (b) (2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of any agency;
- (b) (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), if that statute: (A)(i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (ii) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; and (B) is enacted after the date of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009;
- (b) (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and is privileged or confidential;
- (b) (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; provided that the deliberative process privilege shall not apply to records created 25 years or more before the date on which the records were requested;
- (b) (6) personnel files and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b) (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the information: (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings; (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, foreign agency or authority, or any private institution that furnished information on a confidential basis, and/or when records/information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source; (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law; (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b) (8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for regulation or supervision of financial institutions; and
- (b) (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

**PRIVACY ACT
SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a**

The provisions of the Privacy Act do not apply to:

- (d) (5) material compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action or proceeding;
- (j) (2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) material that is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive Order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy;
- (k) (2) material compiled during investigations for law enforcement purposes (with certain exemptions);
- (k) (3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or other individuals pursuant to section 3056 of Title 18;
- (k) (5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, military service, Federal contracts, or for access to classified information, but only to the extent that the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information to the Government under an express promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence, or prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence; and
- (k) (6) testing or examination material used solely to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in the Federal service-the disclosure of which would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the testing or examination process.

[Redacted] (LEG)

From:
Sent:
To:

[Redacted]
Saturday, August 13, 2022 6:53 PM

b6 -1,3 per FBI
b7C -1,3 per FBI
b7E -3 per FBI

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (MM) (FBI)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] @atf.gov

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] External-

[Redacted]

[Redacted] @bop.gov

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Justin.Fielder@fda.hhs.gov

[Redacted]

[Redacted] @dea.usdoj.gov

[Redacted] @usdoj.gov

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] @atf.gov

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] @state.gov

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (MM)

[Redacted] (FBI)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] External-

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] @usdoj.gov

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[Redacted]

I wanted to also thank all of you for your continued partnership and support for the Miami Field Office. [redacted]

[redacted] The safety and wellness of employees is my paramount concern. Let me assure you that FBI Miami will continue to work with your agencies to identify and monitor threats against law enforcement and will continue to communicate updated information as it becomes available.

If you have any concerns, I encourage you to contact our counterterrorism ASAC, [redacted]

at [redacted] or

[redacted]

v/r,

Bob DeWitt

b6 -1 per FBI
b7C -1 per FBI
b7E -3,4 per FBI



12 August 2022

~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Violent Threats Against Federal Law Enforcement, Courts, and Government Personnel and Facilities Following Court-Authorized Search**

(U) **Scope**

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This *Joint Intelligence Bulletin* is intended to provide information on the potential for domestic violent extremists to carry out attacks on federal, state, and local law enforcement and government personnel or facilities. This *Bulletin* is being shared in light of an increase in threats and acts of violence, including armed encounters, against law enforcement, judiciary, and government personnel, in reaction to the FBI's recent execution of a court-authorized search warrant in Palm Beach, Florida. It is intended to support the activities of the FBI and DHS and assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government; counterterrorism, law enforcement, and court officials; first responders; and private sector security partners in effectively deterring, preventing, preempting, or responding to terrorist attacks against the United States.

(U) Coordinated with the National Counterterrorism Center.

(U) Warning: This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland security officials may share this document with authorized critical infrastructure and key resource personnel and private sector security officials without further approval from DHS.

(U) All US person information has been minimized. For all other inquiries, please contact the Homeland Security Single Point of Service, Request for Information Office at [redacted]@hq.dhs.gov, [redacted]@dhs.sgov.gov, [redacted]@dhs.ic.gov.

(U) Overview

(U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI and DHS have observed an increase in threats to federal law enforcement and, to a lesser extent, other law enforcement and government officials following the FBI's recent execution of a search warrant in Palm Beach, Florida. These threats are occurring

[REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

[REDACTED] The FBI and DHS would like to ensure that law enforcement, court, and government personnel are aware of the range of threats and criminal and violent incidents.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Increase in Observed Violence and Calls for Attacks Against Federal Law Enforcement, Judicial, and Government Personnel

(U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI and DHS are aware of an increase in recent threats and calls for violence against federal law enforcement, US Government, and judicial personnel in reaction to the FBI's execution of a search warrant in Palm Beach, Florida on 8 August 2022. These developments highlight the heightened threat since 2020 by domestic violent extremists (DVEs) motivated by a range of ideologies, who have grievances against a variety of targets including law enforcement.^a

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Since the search, the FBI and DHS have observed an [REDACTED] against federal officials and facilities, including a threat to [REDACTED]

b7E -4,5 per FBI

[REDACTED] Many of these threats include references to the perception that the 2020 presidential election was fraudulent and other claims of government overreach, which are narratives that have mobilized DVEs in the past to commit acts of violence, including against law enforcement and federal, state, and local governments.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Some of these threats are specific in identifying proposed targets, tactics, or weaponry. Since 8 August 2022, the FBI and DHS have identified multiple articulated threats and calls for the targeted killing of judicial, law enforcement, and government officials associated with the Palm Beach search [REDACTED]

b7E -4,5 per FBI

[REDACTED] The FBI and DHS have also observed the personal identifying information of possible targets of violence, such as [REDACTED] disseminated online as additional targets.

b7F -1 per FBI

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 11 August 2022, Ricky Shiffer, Jr., [REDACTED] attempted to forcibly enter the FBI's Cincinnati Field Office. When uniformed officers responded to Shiffer's attempt to break a glass barrier, he fled the scene. A pursuit ensued, and Shiffer entered a standoff with FBI and law enforcement officers after firing multiple shots at responding officers from the Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP). After a prolonged standoff, OSHP, with FBI SWAT support, attempted to arrest Shiffer, resulting in his death.

b7E -4,5 per FBI

^a (U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI and DHS define a domestic violent extremist (DVE) as an individual based and operating primarily within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals wholly or in part through unlawful acts of force or violence. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute extremism and may be constitutionally protected.

- (U//FOUO) [Redacted]

(U) Outlook

(U//FOUO) In recent years, DVEs adhering to different violent extremist ideologies have coalesced around perceptions of government overreach and election fraud to threaten and conduct violence. As a result of recent activities, we assess that potential targets of DVE violence moving forward could include [Redacted]

[Redacted] The threats we have observed, to date, underscore that DVEs may view the 2022 midterm election as an additional flashpoint around which to escalate threats against perceived ideological opponents, including federal law enforcement personnel.

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//FOUO) Although observed threats have predominantly been against federal law enforcement agencies and their facilities, we have historically observed violent actors, including DVEs, are frequently unable or unwilling to differentiate between federal, state, and local law enforcement; separate government agencies; or co-located private businesses. The 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing remains the highest casualty DVE attack in US history and its plotters did not draw a distinction between the multiple government agencies—including a day care facility—occupying the building. More recently, in July 2021, a local Task Force Officer was killed during an attack on an FBI facility in Indianapolis, Indiana.

(U) Past Behaviors Associated With Radicalization and Mobilization to Violence

(U//FOUO) A body of court documents and press reporting reveals several observable behaviors that may indicate radicalization and mobilization to violence by DVEs. It is important to emphasize that many of the mobilization indicators may also relate to constitutionally protected activities. It is important to look critically and contextually at the specific actions of the individual and their intent. Law enforcement action should never be taken solely based on constitutionally protected activities; on the apparent or actual race, age, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity of the subject; or any combination of these factors. Individuals are encouraged to contact law enforcement if—based on these indicators and the situational context—they suspect an individual is mobilizing to violence or engaging in violent extremist activities.

- (U//FOUO) Identifying—in person or online—specific details of an intended violent activity, including target(s), time frames, and participant roles;
- (U//FOUO) Seeking or claiming religious, political, or ideological justification or validation for a planned violent attack;

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Unusual purchase of military-style tactical equipment (for example, body armor or personal protective equipment) in a manner that raises suspicion of planning violence;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Communicating directly with, or seeking to develop a relationship with, violent extremists—or being contacted directly by them—for suspected criminal purposes;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Unusual efforts to obtain explosive precursors, especially illegally or surreptitiously;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Unusual acquisition of weapons or ammunition for suspected criminal purposes;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Unusual change in, or initiation of, physical or weapons training for suspected criminal purposes;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Producing, promoting, or extensively consuming violent extremist content online or in person, including violent extremist videos, narratives, media, and messaging for suspected criminal purposes;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Expressing acceptance of violence as a necessary means to achieve ideological goals (for example, communicating a desire for revenge against ideological opponents) and saying that nonviolent means are ineffective or unavailable;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Increasing or extreme adherence to conspiracy theories as justification of violence against ideological targets; and
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Attempting to radicalize others—especially family members and peers—to violence.

(U) Report Suspicious Activity

(U) We encourage the use of the unclassified information sharing system eGuardian for reporting suspicious activity reports (SARs) to the FBI. eGuardian is accessible via the Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP). If the information is urgent in nature, then please contact your local FBI field office directly and follow up with an eGuardian report. If you need a LEEP account, please navigate to the LEEP homepage at www.cjis.gov and select "Apply for an account". From within LEEP, navigate to LEEP Services and then select eGuardian and an eGuardian application page will be displayed. Further information about the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI) and eGuardian access can also be obtained here: <https://www.dhs.gov/hsi>.

(U) Administrative Note: Law Enforcement Response

(U//~~FOUO~~) Information contained in this intelligence bulletin is for official use only. No portion of this bulletin should be released to the media, the general public, or over nonsecure Internet servers. Release of this material could adversely affect or jeopardize investigative activities.

(U) For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document, please contact the FBI [redacted] by email at [redacted] or the Intelligence Publications Center by e-mail at [redacted]@hq.dhs.gov.

(U) Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.5, HSEC-8.8.3

b7E -2, 3 per FBI

**b6 per DHS, DHS\I&A
b7C per DHS\I&A**